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Abstract
Given the agreed urgency of decarbonizing electricity and the need to guide decen-
tralized private decisions, an adequate and credible carbon price appears essential.
The paper defines and quantifies the useful concept of the break-even carbon price
for mature zero-carbon electricity investments. It appears an attractive alternative
given the diﬃculty of measuring the social cost of carbon, but modelling shows it
extremely sensitive to projected fuel prices, the rate of interest, and the capital cost
of generation options, all of which are very uncertain. This has important implica-
tions, and justifies combining a carbon price floor with suitable long-term contracts
for electricity investments. The same sensitivity demonstrated for the break-even
carbon price translates into similar sensitivities for marginal abatement cost curves.
Keywords: carbon price, electricity, investment, renewables, marginal abatement
cost
JEL Classification: C65, Q42, Q48, Q51, Q54
1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that an eﬃcient climate change mitigation strategy requires the rapid
decarbonization of the power sector (IEA, 2012, 2015; CCC, 2009, 2014). Power sectors in
most advanced economies have competitive privately-owned generation companies trading
∗dmgn@cam.ac.uk. This paper is supported by a donation from the ENEL Foundation under the
project The role of energy subsidies in the European electricity sector. I am indebted to several very
helpful referees’ reports.
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on wholesale fuel and electricity markets, unbundled from transmission, distribution and
retailing. As such they take short-run operating decisions on the basis of spot fuel and
carbon prices and make commercial investment decisions on the basis of forecast fuel and
electricity prices (e.g. DECC, 2014) or computed using simulation models, such as the
DECC Dynamic Dispatch Model (DECC, 2012), given announced taxes and subsidies and
a view about the future time path of CO2 prices.
The UK Government (DECC, 2009) with most other European countries and the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC, 2015) recognize and intend to address the energy policy trilemma:
to deliver reliability, sustainability (decarbonization) and aﬀordability/competitiveness.
Of these three, the hardest question is how best to incentivise the decarbonization of the
power sector. There is considerable dispute as to whether renewables targets, e.g. as spec-
ified in the EC Renewables Directive (EC, 2009), a carbon price, emissions performance
standards (EPS) of the kind introduced in the UK in the Energy Act 2013 (HC, 2013),
or some mix of these policies, possibly embodied in long-term contracts, would be most
cost-eﬀective.
Setting a carbon price would seem the natural approach for a liberalized power sector,
as standards are typically criticized for failing to equilibrate marginal damage costs across
sectors or technologies. For setting the carbon price to be eﬀective in delivering the
objective of rapid decarbonization of the electricity sector, its resulting value should not
be too sensitive to fuel price and other uncertainties. Unfortunately, this is not the case,
as this paper demonstrates, which strengthens the case for supplementary policies. This
paper introduces the concept of a break-even carbon price - the carbon price at which
a zero or low-carbon technology (e.g. an on-shore wind turbine) has the same cost as a
competing more carbon-intensive alternative (e.g. a combined cycle gas turbine, CCGT)
and develops a methodology to explore the sensitivity of this carbon price to key uncertain
parameters, such as future fossil fuel prices, the discount rate and capital costs.
This methodology can be readily applied to a wide range of technology comparisons,
here illustrated with on-shore wind competing with a CCGT, a nuclear plant competing
with an advanced combustion coal plant, and the short-run fuel switching between existing
coal and gas plant. The results are dramatic. Given the predicted range of gas prices in
the near future, the uncertainty about the level of carbon price needed to support on-shore
wind is at least £95/tonne CO2 (120, US$140), or from £35-130/t. CO2. The range of
carbon prices needed to induce a large short-run switch from coal to gas in Britain (the
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results are country and generating stock specific) might be from £5-65/t. CO2. Such a
wide range for the “right” carbon price also throws some doubt on the wider discussion
of whether taxes, quotas or hybrid instruments are best suited to guide CO2 emissions
reductions policies.
Much of the literature that models policies to reduce emissions is somewhat abstract,
usually examining a single technology whose emissions can be aﬀected by investment or
current expenditures, possibly interacting with an uncovered or foreign sector (Mandell,
2008; Holland, 2012), or as a coordination game with other regions to overcome commit-
ment problems (Wirl, 2012), or exploring the “double dividend” of reducing distortionary
taxation elsewhere (Jotzo & Pezzey, 2007; Goulder, 1995). The approach taken here is far
more specific, and examines a liberalized electricity supply industry (ESI), which has im-
portant characteristics that require a taylored approach to designing emissions and related
policies. An eﬃcient energy and climate change suite of policies needs to ensure eﬃcient
operation of existing capacity, eﬃcient choices of new capacity, as well as ensuring eﬃ-
cient demand responses, including energy eﬃciency. Climate change mitigation also needs
an eﬃcient innovation support policy, but that requires additional and complementary
policies.
The next section reviews arguments for setting a carbon price rather than a quota,
then considers the practical problem of setting a carbon price by parameterizing a simple
model for the break-even carbon price in the ESI. Section 3 develops the model. Section
4 shows how the same approach can be applied to determining Marginal Abatement Cost
(MAC) Curves, widely popularised by McKinsey as ways to screen for attractive decar-
bonizing options. Section 5 addresses the problem of designing suitable decarbonization
policies for the ESI and section 6 concludes.
2 Carbon taxes, carbon caps and credibility
A carbon price can be either delivered by fixing a quota or quantity (the cap) and then
trading, as in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) (2003/87/EC), or fixing the price
through some form of carbon tax or charge, such as the Carbon Price Support introduced
in the 2011 UK Budget (HMT, 2011). The classic argument for setting a carbon price is
based on Weitzman (1974), who noted that in the face of uncertainty, a price instrument
(tax or charge) dominates a quantity instrument (a cap or quota) if the marginal benefit
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of reducing emissions is flatter than the marginal abatement cost schedule. The marginal
damage of a tonne of CO2 now is essentially the same as a tonne emitted in 10 years’ time,
as CO2 is resident in the atmosphere and oceans for a century or more. Thus the marginal
benefit of abatement is essentially flat in the rate of emissions, even if the marginal damage
is steeply increasing in the stock of emissions (Grubb & Newbery, 2008).
Weitzman’s original result was derived from a static model with uncertainty resolved
immediately after abatement choices, and so only suitable for flow, not stock pollutants. It
may be suitable for short-run operating decisions of existing capacity (whether to run coal
or gas-fired plant more intensively), but is not well-suited to investment decisions in highly
durable capacity. Nuclear and coal power stations have a life of 60+ years, even if gas-fired
plant and wind turbines have shorter (20+) year lives, periods that commit to significant
lock-in of cumulative emissions and hence a lock-in to a higher and more damaging stock
of greenhouse gases (GHGs). IEA (2012) showed that 83% of 2020 target emissions to
reach the 2 C trajectory were already locked in through existing infrastructure, while
IEA (2015) showed that subsequent emissions have increased, further reinforcing existing
lock-in and squeezing the remaining room for manoeuvre.
To deal with these lock-in and stock eﬀects, one needs an intertemporal model in which
damage depends on the stock of pollutant, not the flow. Pizer (2002) considered a modified
DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994) in which the price or quantity is set in the base year. With
his base calibration, the benefits of setting the optimal price are five times as large as
those of setting the optimal quota. If the damage costs rise suﬃciently rapidly with rising
temperatures, then quotas become more attractive over a 50-year horizon. Such open-loop
models in which agents fail to take account of future policy changes are unsatisfactory. As
time passes we learn more about the likely future consequences of any stock of GHG, and
hence the shape and level of the marginal damage (marginal abatement benefit) schedule.
We also learn more about the costs of abatement and adaptation and need to adjust
policies in light of this new information. While this simplification is understandable given
the complexity of closed-loop models, sensible policy will respond to new information and
this needs to be taken into account.
Hoel and Karp (2002) do this using feed-back optimal control in an intertemporal
stochastic stock pollution model. Cost shocks are serially uncorrelated, the policy maker
can periodically adjust policies in light of their development and investors take this into
account when choosing their plans. Under parameter values that are plausible for GHG
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stocks and climate change, price policies are superior to quantity policies, confirming the
one-period Weitzman intuition. Karp and Zhang (2006) allow for anticipated learning
about future climate change damage and show that such learning favours the use of taxes
rather than quotas. Subsequent more sophisticated dynamic models also tend to support
this finding. Karp and Zhang (2012) point out that if, reasonably, investors have better
cost information than policy makers, carbon taxes are potentially time-inconsistent while
quotas are not in the face of cost shocks. Nevertheless, they find that in their linear-
quadratic model with plausible parameters, taxes are still welfare superior to quotas. This
does highlight a credibility problem with taxes, relevant to the policy choices considered
below.
An eﬃcient path to a low-carbon future must also deliver adequate Research, De-
velopment, Demonstration and Deployment (RDD&D) as part of an Energy Technology
Innovation System (Gallagher, et al. 2012) that requires carefully designed policies (Mer-
cure et al., 2014; Jamasb & Pollitt, 2015; Bointner, 2014; Popp & Newell, 2012; Soriano et
al., 2011). A high carbon price will make such RDD&D more attractive but will fall short
of capturing the full social benefit of innovation and so additional support is warranted,
particularly as patent protection may limit the desired deployment to developing countries.
The same case for additional support applies to still maturing renewables where learning-
by-doing creates beneficial spillovers not captured by developers, but which accelerate
decarbonization elsewhere (Slechten, 2011; Weyant, 2011; Newbery, 2012). Recognizing
that these beneficial externalities justify additional support policies, the question remains
whether a single instrument such as a carbon price will suﬃce to adequately mitigate CO2
emissions in the power sector for mature low-carbon technologies.
A large part of the case for demonstration and deployment support derives from the
learning benefits they can deliver, and the information they reveal about the potential
for future improvement. There is a related literature on whether learning is an argument
for delay until we know more about damages (Karp and Zhang, 2006, and the extensive
literature cited), whether this result is robust to irreversibilities (Chichilniski and Heal,
1993), or conversely, as much of the learning is learning-by-doing that aﬀects abatement
costs, whether the opposite is the case and investments should be advanced (Slechten,
2011). Athanassoglou & Xepapadeas (2012) show that an increase in Knightian uncer-
tainty when choosing the least worst regrets option leads under plausible parameter values
to an increase in precautionary policy.
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Even if a predictable and credible carbon price is desirable for guiding investment
decisions, it has proven politically much easier to introduce a cap-and-trade system with a
free allocation of permits to those who would otherwise be adversely aﬀected and have suf-
ficient political clout to prevent an otherwise widely accepted decision to reduce emissions.
There is a separate and important issue about whether it is easier to agree an international
climate change agreement by coordinating on a carbon price, as Weitzman (2015), Stiglitz
(2015) and Cramton et al. (2015b) argue, or whether an international cap-and-trade agree-
ment is preferable, as Gollier and Tirole (2015) claim. If cap-and-trade agreements are the
likely starting point, hybrid schemes that combine elements of price and quantity schemes
become attractive (Roberts and Spence, 1976; Weitzman, 1978). Hybrid schemes allocate
permits and then keep the price that emerges from trading these permits within bounds
by auctioning permits above a trigger price and setting a floor price.1 The desirable goal
of price predictability, which reduces risk and hence cost, can also be fostered by allowing
banking and borrowing of permits, which also support a carbon price rising at the rate of
interest, as required. Weber and Neuhoﬀ (2010) consider the incentive eﬀects of diﬀerent
policies on innovation incentives and find they can increase the relative attraction of quan-
tity compared to price-based schemes. The logical conclusion is that if there are learning
externalities, these should be addressed with an additional targeted policy instrument.
Setting price bounds can reduce the uncertainty about auction revenues and reduce
fiscal risk, which was certainly a motive for the UK Treasury imposing a Levy Control
Framework to limit budgetary support to renewables in its Electricity Act 2013. Similarly,
defending the upper bound may lead to excessive emissions, again arguing for a limit. Fell
et al. (2012) consider such collars, and argue that a limited soft collar can mitigate most
of the risk — an argument familiar from the early price stabilization literature (Newbery
& Stiglitz, 1981; 1982).
Finally, an emissions performance standard, EPS, has been proposed either as a sup-
plement or an alternative (Holland, 2012; Fischer & Springborn, 2011). That may be a
more robust single instrument at the national level in the face of macro-economic uncer-
tainty, or at the sector level as a back-stop, the reason for the EPS in the UK Electricity
Act 2013. Nevertheless, most of the arguments for choosing quantity instruments or hy-
brids are either (understandable) political arguments, or a recognition that with multiple
1Weber and Neuhoﬀ (2010) point out a number of disadvantages of hybrid schemes, including the
diﬃculty of coordination across regions.
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objectives (e.g. innovation as well as decarbonization) or multiple future states of the
world, more than one instrument is likely desirable. They do not argue against the desir-
ability of delivering a predictable and credible time path of carbon prices to guide private
investment decisions in mature technologies.
The issue of policy credibility is clearly critical when investment decisions are made
by private actors, and here neither quotas nor taxes alone score well. The UK Government
enacted a Carbon Price Support in the Budget of 2011 as a tax on carbon embodied in fuel
used by the electricity sector (HMT, 2011). This was intended to bring the eﬀective carbon
price up from that set in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to a pre-determined
Carbon Price Floor, set to reach £30/tonne carbon dioxide (CO2) by 2020 and £70/t CO2
by 2030. Almost immediately, however, the floor price was frozen at its early low level in
the 2014 Budget, demonstrating the lack of credibility of a tax subject to annual budget
making.
The quotas for the EU ETS are periodically re-set and the ETS has witnessed highly
volatile prices, even in the later periods that allowed banking. From a high of 30/EUA (1
EUA =1 t CO2) in 2008 the price has since fallen to 5-8, making unsubsidized low-carbon
generation investments commercially unattractive. As the cap has to be periodically rene-
gotiated between 28 Member States, and as there are pressures both to prevent its collapse
but also to prevent it reaching levels that make the traded sector uncompetitive, it is dif-
ficult to have confidence in future quotas and resulting carbon prices. For durable capital
decisions, such as generation investment, the logical solution to the credibility problem is
a long-term contract, considered below.
To summarise the literature on the choice of instruments, investor credibility requires
long-term contracts (either, in the ESI, on the carbon price, the electricity price or to
capacity payments), while Weitzman’s original (1974) argument for taxes/prices rather
than quotas for GHG emissions is less clear-cut in a multi-period world with massive
future fossil fuel price uncertainty. At least in the ESI, the test of any instrument is its
ability to induce financiers to view mature low-carbon generation investments as low risk
and hence low (finance) cost options. One possibly unpalatable implication is that the best
instrument and implied carbon price for one sector, such as the ESI, may not be the best
for another sector (transport, construction, heating, etc.) and that the cost of diﬀering
shadow carbon prices co-existing may be oﬀset by the benefits of reducing investment
costs by enhancing credibility and future revenue certainty. In a world of missing markets,
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the simple solutions of uniform corrective prices may no longer apply (Newbery, 2016;
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982).
2.1 Setting a carbon price
Setting a predictable carbon price trajectory or a carbon tax is, however, problematic,
as would be setting the floor and ceiling for price collars. The social cost of carbon
(SCC), explained in Stern (2006) and widely used by agencies such as the US EPA2 “to
estimate the climate benefits of rulemakings” is diﬃcult to estimate with any precision,
as it involves computing the future damage imposed by the current emission of 1 tonne of
CO2 and discounting it back to the present. The social cost of the damage is problematic
as it involves weighting disparate levels of future consumption, as is the discount rate,
which should depend on the state of the future world in which the damage is incurred
(Stern, 2006; Weitzman & Gollier, 2010). For example, Ackerman and Stanton (2012)
find that the 2010 SCC could range from $21/tCO2 to $800/tCO2.
While the SCC may be an attractive way of framing the global public good problem of
climate change, any international negotiation is likely to need a more solidly founded basis
on which to coordinate an international carbon price, given the arguments summarized by
Cramton et al. (2015a). Given the agreement that the price must be at least suﬃcient to
make decarbonizing the electricity supply industry (ESI) rational, one natural choice would
be the price needed to make mature zero-carbon generation commercially viable, since the
carbon targets cannot be met without an almost complete and early decarbonization of the
ESI. The next section demonstrates that the break-even carbon price is highly sensitive
to fossil fuel prices, discount rates and capital costs, all of which are uncertain, making it
diﬃcult to set a suitable carbon price to guide generation investments, or to judge whether
the price delivered by a cap-and-trade system is suitable. It is important to recognise the
significance of this claim, as it is no surprise that choices may depend on assumptions,
which are often uncertain. The problem is not that there is a sensitivity, but that the
resulting range of possible break-even carbon prices dwarfs almost everything else, and far
exceeds the range of prices thrown up by the ETS. Complaints that some intervention is
only justified at a very high carbon price,which might normally be interpreted as evidence
of a very ineﬃcient policy, may no longer be justified if the fuel price (and some other)
2see http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html
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uncertainties are recognised as having extremely wide error bars.
Cullen and Mansur (2014) also point to the sensitivity of the carbon price needed to
stimulate a fuel switch between existing power stations in the US to the price of gas, noting
that recent falls in the price of gas have reduced the required carbon price to achieve a
reduction in ESI carbon emissions. While they do not address the long-run investment
question that is the prime focus here, their finding is consistent with the discussion of short
run MAC curves in section 4. Newbery (2008) developed a similar model of fuel switching
between existing generating plant but primarily directed to its impact on market power
in the gas market, not to the implications for carbon pricing.
2.2 Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
Marginal Abatement Cost Curves (MACCs) have been popularized, particularly by McK-
insey (2007), as a graphic tool for demonstrating the potential and cost of reducing levels
of pollution such as GHG. MACCs have been criticized (e.g. in the paper by Ekins et
al., 2011, which discusses their sensitivity to various cost parameters in depth). The idea
behind the MACC is simple and appealing: in a given economy at some date, how much
abatement of CO2 can be delivered at least cost for each carbon price (e.g. $(2005) per
tonne CO2). Thus McKinsey (2007, exhibit A) shows various MAC schedules for the US
in 2030, which they footnote as depending on “techno-engineering costs.”. In their update
after the financial crisis McKinsey (2010) notes the changes in the MAC curve are linked
to changes in fuel prices (among other factors), as oil prices had increased dramatically
since 2007 — the IEAWEO 2009 increased oil prices to $115/bbl (which, by early 2016 had
fallen to $35/bbl). The updated report noted, however, that its main messages remained
unchanged.
The concept can also be applied to sectors such as the ESI, and that makes it simpler
to see what is involved (and the McKinsey report argues that the investments needed
to deliver GHG reductions are highly concentrated in the power and transport sectors).
The techniques developed below to test the sensitivity of carbon prices needed to guide
investment decisions can similarly be applied to the long-run MACC for the ESI, and with
simplifications, to the short-run MACC. These extensions to deriving MACC sensitivities
are presented in section 4.
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3 The model
There are two reasons for using a carbon price in the ESI — in the short run to deliver an
eﬃcient merit order (the set of plant operating and their output levels) from the existing
portfolio (discussed in section 4.1 in connection with the short-run MACC), and, the main
subject of this paper, to guide investment choices. At the final investment decision date
for zero-carbon plant, it must be more profitable than fossil-fueled alternatives, which
requires a carbon price above the break-even price — the carbon price needed to make
zero-carbon and fossil generation investments equally profitable. The break-even carbon
price depends on the carbon intensity of the fuel,  (t CO2/MWh).3 If zero-carbon
generation is competitive at a fossil fuel price  and a CO2 price of  (£/t CO2), then a
£1/MWh fall in the price of fuel would require an oﬀsetting 1 increase in the price of
CO2 to maintain cost parity between zero-carbon and fossil generation.
The likely future competitive fuel in the ESI is gas. For delivered pipeline gas  = 019
tonnes CO2/MWh, so the multiplier for the CO2 price is 5.24. This makes the break-
even carbon price very sensitive to the gas price. This might not matter if the gas price
were predictable and stable. Unfortunately, this is not the case as its price uncertainty is
large, as shown in Fig. 1. The range between the UK’s low and high wholesale gas price
scenarios for 2017 made at the end of 2015 (DECC, 2015b) is from £12.3/MWh to £23.4
MWh, or £11.1/MWh.4
The range in UK projected 2020 gas prices is £15.7/MWh with an implied range
in the required break-even CO2 price of £82/tonne, which is more than 100% of the
original UK 2030 (supported) carbon price (DECC, 2010). In contrast, for coal,  = 0341,
the multiplier is only 2.93 and the range of UK forecasted coal prices in 2020 is only
£3/MWh (although since 2000 the actual range has been £(2015)6.20/MWh). If coal
were the competitive fuel, the uncertainty in the carbon price would be only £8.8/tonne
(or £18/tonne using the historic range).
3The subscript  refers to the thermal energy content of the fuel, unsubscripted MWh refer to electricity
output.
4DECC publishes wholesale fuel price forecasts (for gas at the trading hub, for coal cif



































































Figure 1: UK fuel prices past and future scenarios (DECC, 2015b)
3.1 Sensitivity to parameters
Fossil generation and zero-carbon generation (wind, PV, nuclear power, etc.) diﬀer in
their cost and operating characteristics in important ways, which for present purposes it
is convenient to measure by levelised costs. To be clear on the meaning of levelised cost,
as an example consider levelising the price. If  is the wholesale price in hour  of year
, then if the time horizon is  and the discount rate is , the levelised price  is defined
first in terms of the base-load (time-weighted) price for that year, , and then over the












   = 8760
Suppose that the relevant lives of the most attractive fossil plant and zero-carbon
plant are the same (e.g. CCGT and on-shore wind) at  , and denote the fuel type by
subscripts (e.g.  =  for wind,  for gas).  and  are respectively the capital cost
in £/MW capacity of wind and gas,  are the fixed O&M costs, £/MWh, (measured
for convenience per hour, averaged over each of the  = 8760 hours of the year),  are
the variable O&M costs in £/MWh,  is the fuel cost in £/MWh,  is the carbon cost
in £/tonne CO2  is the eﬃciency of the fossil generator (MWh/MWh),  are the
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capacity factors (e.g. for wind, the average fraction of equivalent full output hours per
year, assumed constant for any specific wind farm). It is convenient to define two other
parameters,  ≡ 1 is the heat rate, in MWh/MWh.  ≡  is the carbon intensity
of the electricity generated from the fossil fuel.












max( −  − −  0)−
 =  ( −  − − )−
Here  is the output per MW capacity in hour  and year  of the zero-carbon plant
(wind) and  measures the ratio of the average revenue per MWh earned by technology
 =   and the base load (time-weighted) average price in that year (termed the value
factor by Hirth, 2013). Thus in Britain, wind output is positively correlated with price at
low levels of wind penetration, so   1 but as wind penetration increases, it becomes
more dominant in hours of high wind and depresses the price, eventually causing   1
(Green & Vasilakos, 2010). For the fossil (gas) plant,  is the fraction of the time that
the spot price is above the avoidable cost, equal to its capacity factor (CF), while   1 is
its value factor for fossil plant as positive fuel costs mean that plant will not supply when
the price falls below variable operating costs and will therefore supply in the higher-priced
hours. Both  and  are influenced by low-carbon penetration, with  falling but 
rising as zero-carbon low variable cost plant sets low prices in an increasing number of
hours. For a given fossil plant technology, their product will fall over time as this type of
plant becomes less profitable.
The annualization factor to convert the capital cost into an hourly cost is  ≡ ( (1−
− )). The break-even levelised carbon price, , equates the profitability of the competing
technologies:
 = (− )− ( +) =  = (−  −( + ))− ( +) (1)
Here  is the levelised forecast fuel price, , , and  are the levelised forecast values of
the CF, value factors, and net (annual) profits. If the carbon price  is adjusted to remain
at the break-even level and each technology (fossil and zero-carbon) is the most profitable
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currently available, then in competitive equilibrium, the price  adjusts to make both
(excess) net profits zero. Set (1) to zero and eliminate  to give the levelised break-even
carbon price:
 =  (
 + 
 + )− (
 + 
 + )− (2)
Partially diﬀerentiating (2) confirms that  = −1, except that the fuel and carbon
prices are now their levelised values. The break-even carbon price rises with eﬃciency,
, of the marginal entrant fossil plant and with the fixed and variable excess cost of the
zero-carbon plant over the fossil plant (suitably adjusted for price and capacity factors).
Similarly,  = −1 and  = (), both smaller in absolute size than
 with  normally 1 for wind.
If  ≡  + , are the total fixed and capital costs per MWh, then  =
−1 ,  =  . For fossil plant all these parameters are fixed except for , which
will be lower the higher is the capacity share of zero-carbon plant relative to the higher
variable cost fossil plant. For wind turbines,  may be fixed but the relative value factor
 is likely to rise over time with increased penetration. Over time the value of  will
fall as cheaper but less eﬃcient peaking plant is increasingly installed in place of baseload
fossil plant, given the lower value of , so the carbon price will become less sensitive to
excess fixed costs, and as  rises, so the sensitivity of the carbon price to fuel prices will
fall. Thus the sensitivity of the carbon price falls over time with decarbonization.
If we ignore the (lower) dependency of the levelised fuel and carbon costs on the rate
of discount, and concentrate instead on the more sensitive amortization factor, , holding


















(1− − ) (3)
To gain an order of magnitude of the carbon price sensitivities, Table 1 provides cost
and technology estimates and Table 2 gives the levelised fuel prices. These data can be
used to compute the equilibrium levelised carbon and time-weighted electricity prices for
either on-shore wind and a gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) or for base-loaded
nuclear power and Advanced Supercritical Coal (ASC) with flue gas desulphurisation. At
these equilibrium prices the various sensitivities can be calculated, assuming for present
purposes an interest rate of 5% (real) and the central values in Table 1, with the High gas
price discounted over 20 years but the Medium coal price discounted over 40 years.
13
Table 1 Cost and technology parameters
units symbol on-shore wind CCGT Nuclear ASC Coal
£/MW/8760  183 ±50 70± 12 580± 145 190± 20
£/MW/8760  3± 15 27± 06 10± 2 5± 1
£/MWh  4± 1 16± 04 2± 1 2± 1
Lifetime yrs  20± 5 25± 5 60 50± 10
Capacity factor  25%± 3% 40%± 10% 90%± 2% 88%± 2%
HHV %  53%± 1% 41%± 2%
t. CO2/MWh  0 019 0 0341
price factor  1± 01 12± 01 1 11
Source: DECC (2013), NREL (2010)
Table 2 levelised fuel prices for varying time horizons and discount rates
  Gas H Gas L
5%, 20yrs $326 $150
10%, 20yrs $317 $151
5%, 25 yrs $330 $150
Coal H Coal M
5%, 40 yrs $154 $123
10%, 40 yrs $83 $68
5%, 60 yrs $172 $136
Source: DECC (2014)
Table 3 shows in the column headed “Multipliers, ” the values of the ultipliers
, where  is variously    etc., except in this case ==   , for on-fossil or
ossil technology, estimated at equilibrium values of , the full range of uncertainty of
each of the parameters, ∆, from Tables 1 and 2, and the resulting change in , ∆, from
multiplying the multiplier with the range.
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Table 3 Sensitivities and impacts on the break-even carbon price
Multipliers,  Range Response Multipliers,  Range Response
gas v. wind ∆ ∆ Coal v. Nuc. ∆ ∆
 -5.3 £17.6 -£93 -2.9 £6.6 -£19
 -2.8 £0.8 -£2 -1.2 £2 -£2
 2.3 £2 £5 1.2 £2 £2
 -7 £3 -£21 -1.3 £3 -£4
 9.2 £11 £100 1.4 £20 £28
 35 5% £35 31 5% £31
Source: Tables 1, 2
Fig. 2 illustrates this sensitivity graphically comparing gas CCGTwith on-shore wind.
As the price of gas rises along the -axis, for any set of other parameters the break-even
price of CO2 falls (the break-even lines slope down). As the interest rate rises for any gas
price the lines move vertically up and with them the required break-even CO2 price, while
as the capital cost of CCGT rises relative to the wind turbine, so the lines move down, as
does the break-even CO2 price.
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Figure 2: Break-even CO2 prices vs. the gas price
In Table 3, if the gas price were Low instead of High,  would have to increase by
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∆ = ∆ = −53×−$176 = $93/tonne CO2, and if the total fixed cost per MW of
wind,  were to rise by £11/hr,  would need to rise by £100/t. In contrast if nuclear
and ASC coal are both the marginal technologies, the sensitivities are far lower and even
a change in the total fixed cost per hour per MW of nuclear,  were to rise by £20/hr,
 would need to rise by only £28/t (at these perhaps optimistic values for the capital cost
of nuclear stations). Similarly if the rate of interest were to rise from 5% to 10% (i.e.
doubling)  would need to increase by £35/t (wind) or £31/t (nuclear) as the zero-carbon
options are more capital intensive and so more impacted by a rise in the WACC, .
3.2 Other applications and implications
The range of possible low-carbon generation options is wider than just on-shore wind and
nuclear power, and includes solar PV, oﬀ-shore wind, biomass, and carbon capture and
storage (CCS), applied either pre- or post-combustion to coal or CCGTs. Some, such
as biomass and arguably CCS, are mature (at least in their component parts) and for
these the same method can be applied to compare any of these with the least-cost fossil
option. Others are less mature and investments deliver a learning benefit of uncertain but
potentially important value. This can be treated as a credit to the investment (almost all
learning is delivered in the supply chain up to the point of commissioning, although some
may derive from its operation), and can thus be considered as an uncertainty about the
attributable capital cost (i.e. the gross cost less the learning benefit). A more sophisticated
extension would recognize that the optimal decarbonization strategy is likely to require a
portfolio of technologies, as their performance will be imperfectly correlated with uncer-
tain parameters (fossil fuel prices, discount rates, capital costs). At each combination of
generation plant on the eﬃcient risk-reward frontier, there is a weighted average response
of the break-even carbon price allowing for these cross correlations (Roques et al., 2008).
It is also quite standard to compute the implied cost of saving a tonne of CO2 when
examining various policy options such as improving building insulation standards, some of
which are directly observed on auction markets, such as that for ECO.5 In some cases the
numbers are given with spurious precision, but this paper shows there is huge uncertainty
attached to these figures, primarily, but not exclusively, through their dependence on the




One of the most attractive ways to mitigate climate change damage is to stop sub-
sidizing fossil fuels, part of which is the lack of a carbon price. The subsidy estimates
prepared for the EC by Ecofys include a carbon cost of 50/tCO2in 2012. At this price,
climate damage in the EU-28 in 2012 is estimated at 100 billion, double the other ex-
ternal costs (ignoring resource depletion costs, which are a pecuniary externality; Ecofys,
2014, fig 3.13). Ecofys recognizes that the carbon cost is highly uncertain and cites a
range of studies, suggesting a range from 10-100/tCO2in 2012, although Ecofys itself
considers a narrower range from 30-100/tCO2. If instead the break-even carbon cost is
used, the range would if anything increase.
4 Short and long-run MACCs in the ESI
The marginal abatement cost curve, MACC, in the ESI can be computed in the short run
from the options of fuel switching among the set of plant operating and in the long run
assuming enough time to invest in technologies guided by the break-even carbon price. The
amount of carbon saved for the specified level of electricity demand can then be computed
as the diﬀerence between the emissions of the portfolio (or set of operating plant) at each
carbon price and from that the MACC can be constructed, given assumptions about all
costs including fuel costs, as in Cullen and Mansur (2014). They point to the sensitivity
of the carbon price needed to stimulate a fuel switch between existing power stations in
the US to the price of gas, noting that recent falls in the price of gas have reduced the
required carbon price to achieve a reduction in ESI carbon emissions. Their approach is
to econometrically estimate the emissions reduction from the US ESI of a fall in gas prices
from $6 to $2, holding coal prices fixed, and map the resulting response curve into carbon
prices.
Existing generation plant diﬀers in variable costs (including start-up costs for plant
that cycles, averaged over the period of up-time). Let  be the variable O&M and start-
up costs in £/MWh for plant type  (net of any ancillary payments), burning fuel subscript
 (which in this example will be either coal or gas, subscripted  or ),  ( =  ) is
the fuel cost in £/MWh,  is the carbon cost in £/tonne CO2,  is the heat rate of
the generator, and  (t CO2/MWh) the carbon intensity of the fuel. The short-run
marginal cost (SRMC) of plant  of fuel type  is
 =  +( + ) (4)
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Figure 3: Illustrative fossil generation demand duration schedule, GB 2014
As noted above, the carbon intensity of gas is 0.19 tonnes CO2/MWh, while the car-
bon intensity of coal is 0.341 tonnes CO2/MWh. However, the eﬃciency of gas turbines
is higher than typical coal plant, and as the relevant comparison is  ≡ , the eﬀect
is considerably larger. Thus for the more recent CCGTs,  = 50%, so  = 2 and for
sub-critical coal stations,  = 38%,  = 263,  = 038 =  tonnes CO2/MWh (the
carbon intensity of the electricity generated) while  = 090 =  tonnes CO2/MWh,
more than twice as high. In addition to CCGTs, suppose that there is also peaking plant,
taken as open-cycle gas turbines, OCGTs, with eﬃciency  = 35%,  = 286 and
 = 054 tonnes CO2/MWh. Henceforth we indicate the plant type by these subscripts,
, , and .
Fig. 3 shows a linearized version of the adjusted load duration curve for fossil gen-
eration for Great Britain for 2014.6 Ignoring ramping and other operational constraints,
the cheapest plant will run first, and when demand exceeds its capacity, the next cheapest
6The raw data is given in http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Electricity-
transmission-operational-data/Data-Explorer/ and the Total Gross System Demand has been roughly
adjusted for wind, PV and nuclear generation and linearised (although the diﬀerence from the non-
linearised data is modest).
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will run, and so on. The Appendix shows how to derive the short-run MACC given the
various parameters and fuel costs.
4.1 Sensitivity of the short-run ESI MACC to fuel prices and
eﬃciencies
To give a sense of the impact of fuel prices on the MACC consider the simple case in which
there are two types of each coal and gas plant as shown in Table 4, and that the fuel prices
have varied as over the past decade, also shown in Table 4. The variable costs  for these
are similar and so will be ignored, further simplifying equation (7).
Table 4 Illustrative plants and fuel prices for GB
Plant Capacity GW  % heat rate  fuel price L £/MWh H
Large Coal 12 38% 2.63 £5 £10
Med Coal 3 35% 2.86 £5 £10
CCGT older 15 45% 2.22 £10 £20
CCGT newer 12 50% 2.0 £10 £20
Note: Individual capacities illustrative, total capacities representative of GB in 2014
Source: http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Electricity-transmission-
operational-data/Data-Explorer/
Fig. 4 shows the short-run MACCs for three combinations of fuel prices taken from
Table 1 (at low gas prices and high coal prices gas runs baseload and so has already
displaced coal).
The sequence of merit orders even for this simplified model is quite sensitive to the car-
bon price, and starts [LC,MC],NG,OG (meaning that LC runs before MC etc. with square
brackets denoting baseload, after the square bracket mid-merit), then [LC,NG],NG,MC,OG,
then [NG,LC], LC,MC,OG, then [NG,LC],LC,OG,MC, and finally [NG,OG],OG,LC, at
which point all short-run decarbonization options have been exhausted.
4.2 Long-run MACC for electricity
Given enough time and consistency in carbon pricing, the long run allows zero carbon
to displace a large fraction of fossil generation output (except for periods when peaking
plant is required for system balancing and reserve plant for when intermittent generation
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Figure 4: Illustrative short-run MACCs for GB, 2014 for various fuel prices
is inadequate to meet demand). The choice is now choosing how much zero-carbon plant
to install and how much the fossil plant will operate, both of which will depend on the
time horizon over which investments can be made. The only addition required to finding
the break-even carbon price is to compute the amount of CO2 abated as a result of these
investments up to the chosen future date.
5 Designing suitable decarbonization policies
Although it is very attractive to work back and find a carbon price that supports mature
renewable generation, this paper suggests that the resulting value for the required carbon
price is highly sensitive to capital costs, the discount rate, and especially the price of
fuel. These sensitivities decrease with increased zero-carbon penetration, but that is little
comfort in the early investment stage. This creates a dilemma for policy design, as ideally
the carbon price should be predictable to create credible investment decisions, and uniform
across the economy(ies) at each date to deliver decarbonization at least cost. Certainly
in the near term it seems unlikely that the consensus forecast of carbon prices will give
the right signals for long-term highly durable investment decisions in the ESI. It also
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Figure 5: Sources: DECC Digest of UK Energy Statistics, National Grid (2015), DECC
(2015a)
seems reasonable that, given the current consensus on the urgency of avoiding further
carbon lock-in from such durable investment decisions, the objective is to decarbonize the
ESI rapidly as the least worst regrets strategy. If that is accepted, then an immediate
implication is that there should be no new unabated coal generation built. Indeed in 2016
the minister responsible in Britain announced that no coal generation would be allowed
to operate after 2025, which will certainly ensure no new coal plant is built.
That leaves gas as the only acceptable fossil fuel for generation in the short and
medium run. This is consistent with National Grid’s (2015) Gone Green scenario (which,
as its name suggests, is the most aggressive decarbonization scenario), shown in fig. 5.
(Notice that the graph shows output, not capacity, which for gas may need to rise as its
capacity factor falls.)
New investment will need to be that most suited to the evolving portfolio of low-carbon
power stations. Storage hydro has the ideal combination of zero carbon and the ability to
vary output across time in response to intermittent renewables but there is hardly any left
unexploited in Europe. Most renewables except biomass (which has other sustainability
problems) are intermittent and require demand less controllable supply to be able to
accommodate large and rapid changes. That can be delivered through a combination
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of trading over wide areas, flexible generation, demand side response, and/or storage
(ERP, 2015). All options require additional investment in the appropriate technologies and
eﬃcient price signals to make the investments profitable and their instantaneous operation
eﬃcient. The test of energy policies is whether they can deliver these objectives and
decarbonization in a liberalized ESI.
5.1 Comparing policies
The range of policies for decarbonizing electricity include: (1) agreeing (usually interna-
tionally, as in the EU) a sequence of caps under a cap-and-trade system, (2) setting a
carbon price (directly as a tax, or through a carbon price floor), (3) setting an emissions
performance standard (EPS), and (4) providing long-term contracts. Designing and allo-
cating such contracts opens up an additional and quite wide range of options. All four
options (and several contractual variants) have been employed in the UK. Their respective
merits should be judged against whether they are the least-cost solution to the market fail-
ures identified (biassed views on future carbon prices, missing risk and futures markets,
learning spill-overs, etc.), whether they minimize distortions to eﬃcient trade between
technologies at home and internationally, whether they are perceived as credible by in-
vestors and thus reduce the cost of borrowing, whether or not they create political lock-in
that reduces future flexibility, and what incentives they provide for desirable learning and
innovation.
5.1.1 Agreeing caps for cap-and-trade
The fundamental objection to quotas discussed above remains, given that CO2 is a highly
persistent global stock pollutant. It is also politically the simplest instrument for putting
a carbon price in place within a country and agreeing to coordinate between countries.
The challenge is to transform it to deliver an adequate, credible and durable price, which
requires modifying its form (e.g. through possibly soft collars). It is therefore tempting to
leave the carbon price to the existing EU ETS and concentrate on its reform. Apart from
the obvious objection that the current ETS price is too low and so fails to give suitable
long-run investment signals, it faces additional problems. Until low-carbon generation
dominates price determination, the electricity price will be set by fossil generation most
of the time. That means fossil generation enjoys a natural hedge against fuel price un-
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certainty, and hence will appear lower risk and more attractive than equal expected value
zero-carbon plant (Roques et al. 2008). Given the pressure to reform the ETS and raise
the carbon price, the consequential risks facing coal-fired investment may be a suﬃcient
deterrent (certainly in GB), and so it may provide a transition from largely coal-based
ESIs to a fuel mix that has a large share of gas for some time while retaining some old
coal to meet potential residual demand spikes in high net demand periods (winter in N
Europe). In addition, a more aggressive low-carbon deployment strategy of the sort that
makes sense in the ESI will lower the price of carbon facing the remaining sectors in the
ESI, as the Renewables Directive demonstrated, and will not reduce the total emissions of
CO2 unless the cap is also reduced.
Clearly the current ETS does not give good signals on the kinds of investment needed
for the future fuel mix (flexible generation, interconnectors, etc.). The spot price of carbon
is also critical in determining whether existing coal or gas generation is favoured. Thus
the capacity factor of coal plant in the island of Ireland has varied between below 40%
and above 95% since Jan 2012 as the relative carbon-inclusive prices of coal and gas have
varied.7 Short-run eﬃciency between sectors and across trading partners needs a uniform
but also adequate carbon price (and there is agreement that the EU ETS has failed to
deliver an adequate price since 2008).
Raising the ETS price requires agreement to tighten the cap. The diﬃculty is that the
national caps are valuable and agreeing to reduce them is perceived as harming domestic
interests. If future allocations are uniformly scaled back, and if each Member State auc-
tions oﬀ a suﬃcient fraction of its allocation, these states will receive much needed fiscal
revenue which might form the motive for collective agreement, but evidence for success
here is lacking.
5.1.2 Setting a carbon price
The carbon price could be the break-even price defined above and backed out of the abate-
ment cost side, or the social cost of carbon (SCC) based on some view of future damages,
as in the Stern Review (Stern, 2006). The break-even carbon price is too dependent on
future forecasts to be credible by itself, while the SCC is quantitatively too ill-defined, as
argued above. If one EU Member State (MS) sets a high Carbon Price Floor (CPF, as
the UK considered) it will distort trade and be perceived as harming its competitiveness,
7The Single Electricity Market Update (Q2 2015) at http://www.allislandproject.org/en/homepage.aspx
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while coordinating on a CPF may be even harder than coordinating on tighter caps (even
if it has more attractive fiscal attractions), as MS’s defend the right to set their own taxes
more than almost any other policy.
5.1.3 Setting Emissions Performance Standards
The UK set an EPS for new power stations in the Energy Act 2013 of 450gm/kWh averaged
over 7,000 hours (3,150 tonnes CO2 per MW capacity with some exemptions for part CCS
plant). The intention is to make it uneconomic to build new unabated coal or oil-fired
generation operating at base-load (which is the natural configuration for thermal plant)
as such plant has roughly twice this emission factor. Existing coal plant could continue
to operate a reduced number of hours per year to provide balancing services more cheaply
than new peaking plant. Eﬃcient new CCGT would qualify, as would less eﬃcient peaking
plant with an instantaneous emission factor above this level as it would only operate for
less than 1,000 hours/yr. An EPS would thus allow gas to remain an attractive option
but might discourage zero-carbon options for too long unless the EPS were progressively
tightened. Announcing a future path of EPS that applied to all new investment (i.e.,
not grandfathering the EPS ruling at the date of investment) might encourage better
adaptation to the future desired fuel mix, but might also have unintended consequences
if it did not deliver sensible short (time-varying) and longer run prices. It would also be
hard to make it credible to investors.
5.1.4 Long-term contracts
The final option is to provide long-term capacity contracts for zero-carbon plant, where
the payment is conditional on availability (£ nominal/MW), as with the British fossil plant
capacity auction (National Grid, 2014). Auctions work well given adequate competition
but there are too few bidders for a new nuclear plant, for which an optimal procurement
contract is more suited. The assured capacity payments would allow the capital cost to
be financed cheaply from debt, while exposing generators to the correct short-run price
signals for energy and balancing to determine  and . If necessary, the auction oﬀers
could be augmented by a suitable break-even carbon price, or eqivalently, the auctions
would specify the volumes of zero-carbon and balancing capacity to procure. While this
may be criticized as a move back to the Single Buyer model rejected by the EC energy
directives, it retains competitive pressure (for the market), lowers the cost of finance by
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providing more predictable future revenue streams, and allows short-run dispatch to be
market determined.
6 Conclusions
If ESI investment decisions are to be left to the market, then a number of market failures
will need to be addressed. The most obvious is that CO2 emissions should be properly
priced to internalize that externality, but that is not the only externality, as RDD&D
creates valuable public knowledge that is not reflected in the returns to developers. In
addition to the diﬃculty of determining the right carbon price, the problem is amplified by
a number of missing markets. ESI investments are highly durable and futures markets for
more than a few years ahead are lacking. That might not matter if the policy environment
were predictable, but that is far from the case. Perhaps more important, suitable risk
markets are lacking. Fossil generators enjoy a natural hedge as they set the electricity
price, and shift the volatility in fuel, carbon and electricity prices on to consumers and
on to most zero-carbon generators, whose variable costs are close to zero. Consumers are
further denied the option of insuring through future climate change mitigation options in
existing markets.
Decarbonizing electricity is an attractive insurance policy against an increasingly
likely high cost of future climate change damage (Arrow, 2007) but not one consumers
can purchase, except via public policy. This is recognized both in international climate
change negotiations and within the EU in the ETS. While cap-and-trade solutions are
politically attractive as coordination mechanisms, they fail the test of resilience to shocks
that underlies the literature on addressing persistent global stock externalities like GHGs.
They need to be reformed to give credible, durable and adequate price signals. The social
cost of carbon is highly uncertain, and as there is widespread agreement that the ESI
should lead in decarbonizing, it appears operational and therefore attractive to set the
carbon price at the break-even level at which zero-carbon options become commercially
viable. Unfortunately, this break-even price is highly sensitive to fuel price and other
uncertainties. If, for example, gas generation is to be outcompeted by wind, then a fall of
$10/MWh ($2.93/mmBTU) in the price of gas requires an increase of $53/tonne CO2 to
restore parity.
Given the volatility in the forecast price of gas (and other risks), it would be diﬃcult
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to set a carbon price now that would give credible signals over the life of new invest-
ment. Setting an EPS has the merits of ruling out some obviously unattractive choices
like coal-fired generation, but is unlikely by itself to signal the kinds of investment needed
for a low-carbon ESI with growing intermittent renewable power and (commercially) in-
flexible nuclear power. A carbon price floor is valuable in guiding short-run operating
decisions (raising the cost of higher carbon plant and reducing its capacity factor), but
long-term contracts have the advantage of addressing missing market problems (risk and
futures markets) and can be designed to select enough zero-carbon capacity. Auctions
oﬀer the benefits of competitive pressure and some inducements to innovation, but the
contract design (supplemented by other market and regulatory signals for e.g. balancing
and transmission charging) needs to ensure eﬃcient short-run operation, long-term loca-
tional guidance and adequate incentives for RDD&D. The design problem is to retain the
benefits of competition in and for the market while balancing risk and incentives, as in the
classic Principal-Agent problem, while allowing investors to express their diversity of views
about the best route for decarbonization and properly rewarding learning spill-overs. Stan-
dard arguments suggest that it is preferable to separately identifying and providing any
innovation support. That can also be subject to a competitive allocation. It might also be
possible to allow less mature supported technologies to compete with mature technologies
through a more complex package auction.
The extreme form of a risk-reducing contract would be a Single Buyer auctioning
Power Purchase Agreements, typically 20-25 years, with an energy and capacity availability
payment. The optimal energy payment is marginally above the short-run avoidable cost,
and competition is for the capacity payment. This transfers all the risk to final consumers,
minimizing risk costs, but at the expense of relying on the competence of an uncontestable
single agent to make the right technology and innovation choices.
What this paper demonstrates is that climate mitigation strategies need to be tailored
to each sector. In the critical power sector, policies need to address a whole set of missing
markets in the face of the high level of uncertainty that make simple carbon pricing prob-
lematic, and in need of contractual support. The combination of an adequate carbon price
to guide short-run operational decisions combined with long-run competitively allocated
contracts and a better system of rewarding learning spill-overs is the implied package, and
might serve to guide the development of the promised EU Energy Union (EC, 2015).
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7 Appendix Deriving the short-run MACC
Let  be the (de-rated) capacity (in MW) of all plant of type  .8 The load or demand
duration curve is (), which is demand in the  highest demand hour, and 0 ≤  ≤ 
(the number of hours in the year). Suppose that at a zero carbon price (and suitable coal
and gas prices) coal is the cheapest plant, i.e. that the SRMCs are
 =  +   =  +   =  +  (5)
Coal will run as base-load, and its running hours (= ) will be determined by
 = argmax() ≤ . Total generation from coal will be




Total emissions will be  = . Similarly, output from CCGTs will be defined by
 = argmax() ≤  +, and generation and emissions will be
 =  +
Z 

()  = 




()  = 
Peaking plant is assumed not to be displaced as the carbon price rises as it provides
ancillary services (mainly flexibility, low start-up costs and high ramp rates) and so will
be held constant in what follows.
As the carbon price increases, so the SRMC of coal generation rises faster than CCGT,
and at some price  plants with the two fuels will be equally costly. This will occur at
 =  +( + ) =  =  +( + ) (6)
 =  −  + − −   (7)
Above that carbon price in this stark model, CCGT will displace all coal for baseload
and coal will become mid-merit (together with the remaining CCGTs), so now ∗ =
8The de-rated capacity is the average amount of capacity available, allowing for forced and planned
outages.
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argmax() ≤  and ∗ = argmax() ≤ +, the previous value of . The new
values for outputs and emissions will be
∗ = ∗ +
Z 

() ∗ = ∗ 
∗ = ∗ +
Z 

() ∗ = ∗ 
TheMACCwill now have the cost of decarbonization at  and the volume of emissions
abated at ∆ = (∗ − ) + (∗ − ). The sensitivity of the carbon price to the fuel








 −  
With the heat rates and emissions coeﬃcients above,  = 39, and  = −51.
The are large multiples given that one-year ahead gas forecast prices vary from £16-
£28/MWh and coal prices from £7-10/MWh (DECC, 2014b). Thus holding coal prices
constant and varying the gas price over this range, the cost of abating 68 kt CO2 could
vary by 39 × $12 = $46/tonne, while a rise in coal prices of £3/MWh (holding gas
prices constant) could lower the abatement cost by 51×$3 = $15/tonne, given the plant
assumptions behind fig. 2.
In practice there will be a range of coal and CCGT plant of varying eﬃciencies. The
MACC can be more finely graduated by considering variations in heat rates for diﬀerent
models of coal and CCGT plant. The least eﬃcient coal plant will have heat rate  
,  = 1  − 1. The most eﬃcient CCGT will have heat rate 1  ,  = 2 
(assuming for simplicity that the variable costs are the same within each fuel type, but
this assumption can be readily relaxed). Equation (7) gives the carbon price at which the
most eﬃcient CCGT displaces the least eﬃcient coal plant, with suitable subscripts on
the heat rates. Subsequent steps have the least eﬃcient gas displacing more eﬃcient coal,
until all coal is displaced for baseload running and coal moves to mid-merit.
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